Category: OPCW

Press Release: Leading International Voices and Chemical Weapons Experts Call for Accountability and Transparency at the OPCW

Post author By Nathan
Post date March 12, 2021

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
12 March 2021
Contact: courage.contact@couragefound.org

Leading International Voices and Chemical Weapons Experts Call for Accountability and Transparency at the OPCW

After nearly two years of controversy surrounding the 2018 alleged chemical weapon attack in Douma, Syria, involving repeated leaks and protests by dissenting OPCW scientists, a Statement of Concern was sent to the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (and copied to delegations of all 193 member states) calling for transparency and accountability at the Organisation. Signatories in support include 25 internationally respected persons among them OPCW’s first Director General, former OPCW inspectors and two former UN Assistant Secretaries-General.

In April 2018, approximately 50 civilians were allegedly killed in a chemical weapons attack in the town of Douma, Syria. Within a week, the US, British and French Governments had carried out retaliatory airstrikes based upon the assertion that the Syrian government was responsible for the alleged attack and before an OPCW investigation had been conducted. The OPCW deployed a Fact Finding Mission (FFM) shortly after the alleged attack and issued a first interim report in the Summer of 2018 and a Final Report on March 1 2019. The final report found there were reasonable grounds to believe chlorine had been used as a weapon and implied that the attack had been carried out by the Syrian Air Force.

Controversy quickly ensued with the leaking of an internal OPCW engineering study which cast doubt on the official version. The OPCW initiated an internal investigation to identify who had leaked the engineering study. Late in 2019, a former OPCW official detailed major scientific and procedural irregularities to a panel hosted by the Courage Foundation in October 2019.

Since then, multiple documents have been published via WikiLeaks and The Grayzone whilst the OPCW leak investigation failed to identify the source of the engineering study leak but instead castigated two of its former scientists who had raised concerns about the FFM investigation. Two Arria formula meetings of the UN Security Council have included statements from a former OPCW scientist whilst formal UN Security Council meetings have seen a statement of concern read on behalf of the first Director General Jose Bustani (UNSC, 5 October 2020) and direct questioning of the OPCW Director General Fernando Arias (UNSC, 11 December 2020). In late 2020, in an apparent attempt to smear one of its former scientists, a letter was leaked from the OPCW to the open source investigation organisation known as Bellingcat. It subsequently transpired that the leak story published by Bellingcat was in fact incorrect and possibly a consequence of deliberate disinformation.

The purpose of the initiative to request transparency and accountability from the OPCW has four underlying reasons: 1. To restore the credibility and trust in a major international organisation and to protect its independence, 2. to protest over the deliberate redaction of evidence in the Douma case and a failure to conduct a credible and transparent investigation; 3. to express the serious concern that the incident of Douma has become yet another example of fraudulent manipulation of facts to justify political and military actions reminiscent of the earlier fabricated story about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq which was used to justify a war; 4. to protect civil society in Syria and, ultimately, elsewhere from future suffering.

In view of the seriousness of this on-going controversy, the Statement of Concern calls upon the OPCW to act responsibly in order to ‘restore’ its ‘credibility and integrity’.

The Statement of Concern has been sent to the OPCW Director General and all OPCW state parties, the UN Secretary General, the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, and other UN entities.

Press Inquiries should be addressed to the ‘The Berlin Group 21’ care of ‘The Courage Foundation’ at courage.contact@couragefound.org or Nathan.fuller@couragefound.org

The Statement of Concern and Supporting Signatories can be read here.

Additional Background information provided by the Berlin Group can be read here.

Translations into German, French, Arabic and Spanish are available here.

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OPCW Press Release

Additional Background Information Regarding the OPCW FFM Investigation of the Alleged Chemical Attack in Douma, April 7, 2018

Post author By Nathan
Post date March 11, 2021

Additional Background Information (provided by the Berlin Group 21)

The following points summarize key procedural and scientific flaws that have been identified and which are now in the public domain regarding the OPCW FFM Investigation of the Alleged Chemical Attack in Douma, April 7, 2018.

Procedural Irregularities

1) The Syria FFMs operate under bureaucratic not scientific control. The Office of the Director General (ODG), which has neither technical nor scientific expertise, controls the investigative and reporting aspects of the FFMs and, unlike the case of routine verification inspections, excludes scientific scrutiny and formal peer review by the technical departments, namely the Inspectorate and Verification Divisions.

This arrangement is inconsistent with sound scientific practices and creates the opportunity for undue political influence to be exerted on the Syria FFMs. Moreover, it allows the questionable practices of a handful of senior staff who exercise control over the FFMs to taint the reputation of the OPCW, most of whose staff work with professionalism and integrity.

2) The original interim report was secretly modified and issued for publication in June 2018 and only stopped when this act of deception was discovered by a member of the Douma team. The modifications effectively drew unsupported conclusions that there was sufficient evidence at that time of a chlorine gas release and censored issues about chemistry, toxicology, ballistics and witness testimony that had been raised in the original interim report.

This attempt within the OPCW to secretly alter the original interim report and underhandedly publish a doctored version unknown to the inspectors is fraudulent and incompatible with the expected behaviour of a trusted international organization.

3) A US delegation, without any prior notice, was allowed to brief the investigation team just days before the interim report was published (two weeks after the duplicitous attempt to publish the doctored interim report had been thwarted) to promote their assessment that chemical weapons had been used by the Syrian government. This is quite distinct from a member state offering data or intelligence to the OPCW to help the investigation, which States Parties are legitimately encouraged to do.

A State Party seeking to influence the inspectors in this manner, however, is not only a violation of Article VIII (paragraph 47) of the Chemical Weapons Convention “CWC” (which states ‘Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties’) but also contravenes a regularly-cited dictum of the Director General that the identities of inspectors must be protected to both maintain the integrity of the investigation and for their personal security.

4) After the FFM team had returned to The Hague most of the team who were on the ground in Syria were excluded from continuing the investigation. This exclusion became more pronounced after the release of the published interim report in July 2018 and through to the release of the final FFM report in March 2019. According to a recently leaked letter from one dissenting inspector to the Director-General there were never any discussions, meetings, or sharing of views or information between the on-site inspectors in Damascus and the team leader who had left Damascus before the investigation began but who nonetheless played a leading role in writing the final report. The letter also claimed that within the team ‘there was an intolerance for views on alternative hypotheses.’

Preventing full and open discussion amongst inspectors who had actually been to Douma, and who had extensive experience, is not compatible with a scientific, objective and transparent investigation.

5) Throughout 2018 and 2019, senior OPCW management ignored and/or suppressed substantial concerns raised by members of the FFM investigation team. The OPCW does not have a whistleblower policy and has been criticized by auditors for this failure. In this context, two highly experienced inspectors and members of the Douma FFM made multiple attempts to raise their concerns internally. These attempts included requests to initiate an internal inquiry by the OPCW’s Office of Internal Oversight and repeated requests to meet with the Director General of the OPCW. All were ignored.

It is not normal or justified for the inspectors’ concerns to be ignored in this way and this conduct is at odds with a well-functioning organization. Refusal to hear the concerns of two highly experienced inspectors is incompatible with a scientific, objective and transparent investigation.

6) The OPCW Director General has attempted to dismiss one of the dissenting inspector’s concerns on the grounds that the bulk of investigative and analytical work on the Douma investigation occurred after he left the organisation in September 2018. This claim is misleading: Comparing the final report with the leaked original interim report, it is clear that the bulk of the 106-page final report was already written by June 2018 when 70% of all samples had already been analysed, an official toxicology assessment had already been conducted with NATO experts, and 87% of witness interviews had been conducted and analysed. Although studies on the cylinders were carried out by unknown external contractors during the Autumn of 2018, the conclusions were contradicted by a similar study from within the FFM (see c below). No additional Bibliography has been added to the final report suggesting there was no further scientific research conducted (compare Annex 13 of the final report with the Bibliography [last page] of the leaked original interim report).

It is, therefore, misleading for the Director General to discount the concerns of one of the dissenting inspectors on these grounds. Moreover, regardless of what work was carried out in the last 6 months, it in no way excuses the irregular and possible fraudulent behavior throughout the investigation whilst the substantive scientific issues raised in the original interim report remain unresolved in the final FFM report (see points a- d below).

7) In November 2020 a draft letter, falsely alleged to have been sent by the Director General in response to a private letter from inspector Dr. Whelan to Mr. Arias (mentioned in point 4 above) in which he outlined his concerns about the Douma investigation, was leaked to an ‘open source’ investigation website which then published the draft letter together with the identity of the inspector in question. The intention of the leak, and the associated article published by Bellingcat, was clearly to discredit the OPCW inspector and create the misleading impression that all concerns raised by him had been addressed. In fact, the draft letter was never sent by the Director General and no detailed response was ever given to the issues raised by Whelan. Shortly after this occurrence, in December 2020, a BBC4 radio series aired in which an anonymous source, reportedly connected with the OPCW Douma investigation, contributed to an attempt to discredit the two dissenting inspectors and Ambassador Bustani himself.

These developments suggest that one or more individuals within the OPCW are involved with leaking disinformation and attempting to discredit the OPCW scientists who have raised concerns about the Douma investigation.

Scientific Flaws

Key scientific flaws were documented by the Courage Foundation panel in October 2019. Key issues (not exhaustive) are as follows:

a. Chemical Analysis:

The final FFM report published in March 2019 fails to provide key information regarding the analysis of environmental samples– the levels of chemicals detected, analysis of control samples, and consideration of benign sources of the chemicals found – necessary to substantiate its finding that chlorine gas was present or likely present at either of the two locations investigated.

Furthermore, the final report includes what appears to be fabricated evidence: Whilst acknowledging that the tell-tale chemicals supposedly indicating chlorine use can also be generated by contact of samples with sodium hypochlorite (the main ingredient of household bleaching agent) (final report: para 8.13 & para 8.15), this is ruled out on the basis that “[a] t both locations, there were no visible signs of a bleach agent or discoloration due to contact with a bleach agent” (final report: para 8.16). It has been reported, however, (and has not been denied by the Organisation) that no such ‘negative’ observation was recorded during the on-site inspection and it is unclear on what basis this claim was inserted into the final report, particularly since open-source videos show evidence of bleach stains on some of the victims clothing.

As such, the final report fails to provide sufficient evidence to indicate chlorine gas was present at the alleged attack sites.

b) Regarding toxicological evidence, the toxicology assessment produced in consultation with NATO chemical weapon toxicology experts in June 2018 (noted above in point 6) clearly concluded that both signs and symptoms reported and observed, as well as the arrangement of the deceased at Location 2 (gathered in piles and indicating no attempt to escape), were inconsistent with chlorine gas at Location 2 being the cause of death. This conclusion, however, was obfuscated without any explanation or justification, in the final OPCW FFM report. The final report mentions that toxicology experts were consulted in September and October 2018 but notably never details their assessment. Instead, the report states that ‘it is not currently possible to precisely link the cause of the signs and symptoms to a specific chemical’. As such, the report substitutes clear unequivocal opinions from toxicologists expert in chemical weapons poisoning for an unspecific statement which is not attributed to toxicologists that are reported to have been consulted in September and October.

As such, the final OPCW FFM report has omitted key evidence that ruled out chlorine as the cause of death, apparently justifying the omission because other experts were subsequently consulted (but whose professional opinions are not reported). Such cherry-picking of evidence is highly irregular possibly amounting to scientific fraud.

c) Regarding ballistics evidence pertaining to the two chlorine cylinders allegedly dropped from a helicopter, the final OPCW FFM report asserts that three independent external experts concluded that the damage to the cylinders and roofs were compatible with a fall from height. Moreover, they claim, without providing any technical explanation or evidence, that the cylinder at one location, after penetrating through the roof, took a sideways bounce onto a nearby bed, apparently in defiance of physical laws. These conclusions were inconsistent with earlier findings and observations of the FFM team, many of which were noted in the suppressed original interim report, as well as with those of an engineering assessment of the two cylinders. Moreover, the final report contains unresolved inconsistencies and insufficient explanatory material.

As such, the final report does not provide adequate evidence nor analysis to support a claim that the cylinders were dropped from a significant height.

d) Regarding witness testimonies, the reporting of witness statements and the lack of analysis or corroboration highlights the partiality of the final report. It is now known from the leaked original interim report that there were diametrically opposing narratives of what had happened depending on which country the interviews were conducted (a distinction that was blurred in the final report). Those interviewed in Country X (who were generally either members of the White Helmets, or were brought to the inspectors by the White Helmets), supported the narrative that there had been a chemical attack. On the other hand, those interviewed in Damascus (who were provided to the inspectors by the Syrian authorities) reported no evidence of a chemical attack. Whilst two clearly distinct and opposing narratives are described by witnesses, only the one supportive of the use of toxic weapons contributes to the conclusions in the final report.

As such, the final report fails to resolve sharply divergent witness testimonies and, furthermore, obfuscates testimonies that cast doubt on the occurrence of a chemical weapon attack.

News OPCW

Statement of Concern: The OPCW investigation of alleged chemical weapons use in Douma, Syria

Post author By Nathan
Post date March 11, 2021

Statement of Concern

The OPCW investigation of alleged chemical weapons use in Douma, Syria

We wish to express our deep concern over the protracted controversy and political fall-out surrounding the OPCW and its investigation of the alleged chemical weapon attacks in Douma, Syria, on 7 April 2018.

Since the publication by the OPCW of its final report in March 2019, a series of worrying developments has raised serious and substantial concerns with respect to the conduct of that investigation. These developments include instances in which OPCW inspectors involved with the investigation have identified major procedural and scientific irregularities, the leaking of a significant quantity of corroborating documents, and damning statements provided to UN Security Council meetings. It is now well established that some senior inspectors involved with the investigation, one of whom played a central role, reject how the investigation derived its conclusions, and OPCW management now stands accused of accepting unsubstantiated or possibly manipulated findings with the most serious geo-political and security implications. Calls by some members of the Executive Council of the OPCW to allow all inspectors to be heard were blocked.

The inspectors’ concerns are shared by the first Director General of the OPCW, José Bustani, and a significant number of eminent individuals have called for transparency and accountability at the OPCW. Bustani himself was recently prevented by key members of the Security Council from participating in a hearing on the Syrian dossier. As Ambassador Bustani stated in a personal appeal to the Director General, if the Organization is confident in the conduct of its Douma investigation then it should have no difficulty addressing the inspectors’ concerns.

To date, unfortunately, the OPCW senior management has failed to adequately respond to the allegations against it and, despite making statements to the contrary, we understand has never properly allowed the views or concerns of the members of the investigation team to be heard or even met with most of them. It has, instead, side-stepped the issue by launching an investigation into a leaked document related to the Douma case and by publicly condemning its most experienced inspectors for speaking out.

In a worrying recent development, a draft letter falsely alleged to have been sent by the Director General to one of the dissenting inspectors was leaked to an ‘open source’ investigation website in an apparent attempt to smear the former senior OPCW scientist. The ‘open source’ website then published the draft letter together with the identity of the inspector in question. Even more alarmingly, in a BBC4 radio series aired recently, an anonymous source, reportedly connected with the OPCW Douma investigation, gave an interview with the BBC in which he contributes to an attempt to discredit not only the two dissenting inspectors, but even Ambassador Bustani himself. Importantly, recent leaks in December 2020 have evidenced that a number of senior OPCW officials were supportive of one OPCW inspector who had spoken out with respect to malpractice.

The issue at hand threatens to severely damage the reputation and credibility of the OPCW and undermine its vital role in the pursuit of international peace and security. It is simply not tenable for a scientific organization such as the OPCW to refuse to respond openly to the criticisms and concerns of its own scientists whilst being associated with attempts to discredit and smear those scientists. Moreover, the on-going controversy regarding the Douma report also raises concerns with respect to the reliability of previous FFM reports, including the investigation of the alleged attack at Khan Shaykhun in 2017.

We believe that the interests of the OPCW are best served by the Director General providing a transparent and neutral forum in which the concerns of all the investigators can be heard as well as ensuring that a fully objective and scientific investigation is completed.

To that end, we call on the Director General of the OPCW to find the courage to address the problems within his organization relating to this investigation and ensure States Parties and the United Nations are informed accordingly. In this way we hope and believe that the credibility and integrity of the OPCW can be restored.

Signatories in Support of the Statement of Concern:

José Bustani, Ambassador of Brazil, first Director General of the OPCW and former Ambassador to the United Kingdom and France.

Professor Noam Chomsky, Laureate Professor U. of Arizona and Institute Professor (em), MIT.

Andrew Cockburn, Washington editor, Harper’s Magazine.

Daniel Ellsberg, PERI Distinguished Research Fellow, UMass Amherst. Former Defense and State Department official. Former official of Defense Department (GS-18) and State Department (FSR-1).

Professor Richard Falk, Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton University.

Tulsi Gabbard, former Presidential candidate and Member of the US House of Representatives (2013-2021).

Professor Dr. Ulrich Gottstein, on behalf of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW-Germany).

Katharine Gun, former GCHQ (UKGOV), whistleblower.

Denis J. Halliday, UN Assistant Secretary-General (1994-98).

Professor Pervez Houdbhoy, Quaid-e-Azam University and ex Pugwash.

Kristinn Hrafnnson, Editor in Chief, Wikileaks.

Dr. Sabine Krüger, Analytical Chemist, Former OPCW Inspector 1997-2009.

Ray McGovern, ex-CIA Presidential Briefer; co-founder, Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity.

Elizabeth Murray, former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, National Intelligence Council (rtd); member, Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity and Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in Intelligence.

Professor Götz Neuneck, Pugwash Council and German Pugwash Chair.

Dirk van Niekerk, former OPCW Inspection Team Leader, Head of OPCW Special Mission to Iraq

John Pilger, Emmy and Bafta winning journalist and film maker.

Professor Theodore A. Postol, Professor Emeritus of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Dr. Antonius Roof, former OPCW Inspection Team Leader and Head Industry Inspections.

Professor John Avery Scales, Professor, Pugwash Council and Danish Pugwash Chair.

Hans von Sponeck, former UN Assistant Secretary General and UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator (Iraq).

Alan Steadman, Chemical Weapons Munitions Specialist, Former OPCW Inspection Team Leader and UNSCOM Inspector.

Jonathan Steele, journalist and author.

Roger Waters, Musician and Activist.

Lord West of Spithead, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff 2002-06.

Oliver Stone, Film Director, Producer and Writer.

Colonel (ret.) Lawrence B. Wilkerson, U.S. Army, Visiting Professor at William and Mary College and former chief of staff to United States Secretary of State Colin Powell.

OPCW Resources

Ex-OPCW chief José Bustani’s statement to the UN Security Council

Post author By Nathan
Post date October 6, 2020

Mr Chairman, Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia, your excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen,

My name is José Bustani. I am honoured to have been invited to present a statement for this meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the Syrian chemical dossier and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. As the OPCW’s first Director General, a position I held from 1997 to 2002, I naturally retain a keen interest in the evolution and fortunes of the Organisation. I have been particularly interested in recent developments regarding the Organisation’s work in Syria.

For those of you who are not aware, I was removed from office following a US-orchestrated campaign in 2002 for, ironically, trying to uphold the Chemical Weapons Convention. My removal was subsequently ruled to be illegal by the International Labour Organisation’s Administrative Tribunal, but despite this unpleasant experience the OPCW remains close to my heart. It is a special Organisation with an important mandate. I accepted the position of Director General precisely because the Chemical Weapons Convention was non-discriminatory. I took immense pride in the independence, impartiality, and professionalism of its inspectors and wider staff in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention. No State Party was to be considered above the rest and the hallmark of the Organisation’s work was the even-handedness with which all Member States were treated regardless of size, political might, or economic clout.

Although no longer at the helm by this time, I felt great joy when the OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013 “for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons”. It was a mandate towards which I and countless other former staff members had worked tirelessly. In the nascent years of the OPCW, we faced a number of challenges, but we overcame them to earn the Organisation a well-deserved reputation for effectiveness and efficiency, not to mention autonomy, impartiality, and a refusal to be politicised. The ILO decision on my removal was an official and public reassertion of the importance of these principles.

More recently, the OPCW’s investigations of alleged uses of chemical weapons have no doubt created even greater challenges for the Organisation. It was precisely for this kind of eventuality that we had developed operating procedures, analytical methods, as well as extensive training programmes, in strict accordance with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Allegations of the actual use of chemical weapons were a prospect for which we hoped our preparations would never be required. Unfortunately, they were, and today allegations of chemical weapons use are a sad reality.

It is against this backdrop that serious questions are now being raised over whether the independence, impartiality, and professionalism of some of the Organisation’s work is being severely compromised, possibly under pressure from some Member States. Of particular concern are the circumstances surrounding the OPCW’s investigation of the alleged chemical attack in Douma, Syria, on 7 April 2018. These concerns are emanating from the very heart of the Organisation, from the very scientists and engineers involved in the Douma investigation.

In October 2019 I was invited by the Courage Foundation, an international organisation that ‘supports those who risk life or liberty to make significant contributions to the historical record’, to participate in a panel along with a number of eminent international figures from the fields of international law, disarmament, military operations, medicine, and intelligence. The panel was convened to hear the concerns of an OPCW official over the conduct of the Organisation’s investigation into the Douma incident.

The expert provided compelling and documentary evidence of highly questionable, and potentially fraudulent conduct in the investigative process. In a joint public statement, the Panel was, and I quote, ‘unanimous in expressing [its] alarm over unacceptable practices in the investigation of the alleged chemical attack in Douma’. The Panel further called on the OPCW, ‘to permit all inspectors who took part in the Douma investigation to come forward and report their differing observations in an appropriate forum of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, in fulfilment of the spirit of the Convention.’ .

I was personally so disturbed by the testimony and evidence presented to the Panel, that I was compelled to make a public statement. I quote: “I have always expected the OPCW to be a true paradigm of multilateralism. My hope is that the concerns expressed publicly by the Panel, in its joint consensus statement, will catalyse a process by which the Organisation can be resurrected to become the independent and non-discriminatory body it used to be.”

The call for greater transparency from the OPCW further intensified in November 2019 when an open letter of support for the Courage Foundation declaration was sent to Permanent Representatives to the OPCW to, , ‘ask for [their] support in taking action at the forthcoming Conference of States Parties aimed at restoring the integrity of the OPCW and regaining public trust.’

The signatories of this petition included such eminent figures as Noam Chomsky, Emeritus Professor at MIT; Marcello Ferrada de Noli, Chair of the Swedish Doctors for Human Rights; Coleen Rowley, whistle-blower and a 2002 Time Magazine Person of the Year; Hans von Sponeck, former UN Assistant Secretary-General; and Film Director Oliver Stone, to mention a few.

Almost one year later, the OPCW has still not responded to these requests, nor to the ever-growing controversy surrounding the Douma investigation. Rather, it has hidden behind an impenetrable wall of silence and opacity, making any meaningful dialogue impossible. On the one occasion when it did address the inspectors’ concerns in public, it was only to accuse them of breaching confidentiality. Of course, Inspectors – and indeed all OPCW staff members – have responsibilities to respect confidentiality rules. But the OPCW has the primary responsibility – to faithfully ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Article VIII, para 1).

The work of the Organisation must be transparent, for without transparency there is no trust. And trust is what binds the OPCW together. If Member States do not have trust in the fairness and objectivity of the work of the OPCW, then its effectiveness as a global watchdog for chemical weapons is severely compromised.

And transparency and confidentiality are not mutually exclusive. But confidentiality cannot be invoked as a smoke screen for irregular behaviour. The Organisation needs to restore the public trust it once had and which no one denies is now waning. Which is why we are here today.

It would be inappropriate for me to advise on, or even to suggest how the OPCW should go about regaining public trust. Still, as someone who has experienced both rewarding and tumultuous times with the OPCW, I would like to make a personal plea to you, Mr Fernando Arias, as Director General of the OPCW. The inspectors are among the Organisation’s most valuable assets. As scientists and engineers, their specialist knowledge and inputs are essential for good decision making. Most importantly, their views are untainted by politics or national interests. They only rely on the science. The inspectors in the Douma investigation have a simple request – that they be given the opportunity to meet with you to express their concerns to you in person, in a manner that is both transparent and accountable.

This is surely the minimum that they can expect. At great risk to themselves, they have dared to speak out against possible irregular behaviour in your Organisation, and it is without doubt in your, in the Organisation’s, and in the world’s interest that you hear them out. The Convention itself showed great foresight in allowing inspectors to offer differing observations, even in investigations of alleged uses of chemical weapons (paras 62 and 66 of Part II, Ver. Annex). This right, is, and I quote, ‘a constitutive element supporting the independence and objectivity of inspections’. This language comes from Ralf Trapp and Walter Krutzsch’s “A commentary on Verification Practice under the CWC”, published by the OPCW itself during my time as DG.

Regardless of whether or not there is substance to the concerns raised about the OPCW’s behaviour in the Douma investigation, hearing what your own inspectors have to say would be an important first step in mending the Organisation’s damaged reputation. The dissenting inspectors are not claiming to be right, but they do want to be given a fair hearing. As one Director General to another, I respect-fully request that you grant them this opportunity. If the OPCW is confident in the robustness of its scientific work on Douma and in the integrity of the investigation, then it has little to fear in hearing out its inspectors. If, however, the claims of evidence suppression, selective use of data, and exclusion of key investigators, among other allegations, are not unfounded, then it is even more imperative that the issue be dealt with openly and urgently.

This Organisation has already achieved greatness. If it has slipped, it nonetheless still has the opportunity to repair itself, and to grow to become even greater. The world needs a credible chemical weapons watchdog. We had one, and I am confident, Mr Arias, that you will see to it that we have one again.

Thank you.

OPCW Release

Analytical Points: OPCW Panel

Post author By Nathan
Post date October 23, 2019

Read the OPCW Panel Statement

Quotes from José Bustani, First Director General OPCW and former Ambassador to the United Kingdom and France

“The convincing evidence of irregular behaviour in the OPCW investigation of the alleged Douma chemical attack confirms doubts and suspicions I already had. I could make no sense of what I was reading in the international press. Even official reports of investigations seemed incoherent at best. The picture is certainly clearer now, although very disturbing”

“I have always expected the OPCW to be a true paradigm of multilateralism. My hope is that the concerns expressed publicly by the Panel, in its joint consensus statement, will catalyse a process by which the Organisation can be resurrected to become the independent and non-discriminatory body it used to be.”

Analytical Points

General

A critical analysis of the final report of the Douma investigation left the panel in little doubt that conclusions drawn from each of the key evidentiary pillars of the investigation (chemical analysis, toxicology, ballistics and witness testimonies) are flawed and bear little relation to the facts.

Chemical Analysis

Although biomedical analyses supposedly contributed to the conclusions of the report (para 2.17), the same report is unequivocal in stating that “no relevant chemicals were found” in biological samples (Table A5.2).

The interpretation of the environmental analysis results is equally questionable. Many, if not all, of the so- called ‘smoking gun” chlorinated organic chemicals claimed to be “not naturally present in the environment” (para 2.6) are in fact ubiquitous in the background, either naturally or anthropogenically (wood preservatives, chlorinated water supplies etc). The report, in fact, acknowledges this in Annex 4 para 7, even stating the importance of gathering control samples to measure the background for such chlorinated organic derivatives. Yet, no analysis results for these same control samples (Annex 5), which inspectors on the ground would have gone to great lengths to gather, were reported.

Although the report stresses the ‘levels’ of the chlorinated organic chemicals as a basis for its conclusions (para 2.6), it never mentions what those levels were —high, low, trace, sub-trace? Without providing data on the levels of these so-called ‘smoking-gun’ chemicals either for background or test samples, it is impossible to know if they were not simply due to background presence. In this regard, the panel is disturbed to learn that quantitative results for the levels of ‘smoking gun’ chemicals in specific samples were available to the investigators but this decisive information was withheld from the report.

The final report also acknowledges that the tell-tale chemicals supposedly indicating chlorine use, can also be generated by contact of samples with sodium hypochlorite, the principal ingredient of household bleaching agent (para 8.15). This game-changing hypothesis is, however, dismissed (and as it transpires, incorrectly) by stating no bleaching was observed at the site of investigation. (“At both locations, there were no visible signs of a bleach agent or discoloration due to contact with a bleach agent”). The panel has been informed that no such observation was recorded during the on-site inspection and in any case dismissing the hypothesis simply by claiming the non-observation of discoloration in an already dusty and scorched environment seems tenuous and unscientific.

Toxicology

The toxicological studies also reveal inconsistencies, incoherence and possible scientific irregularities. Consultations with toxicologists are reported to have taken place in September and October 2018 (para 8.87 and Annex 3), but no mention is made of what those same experts opined or concluded. Whilst the final toxicological assessment of the authors states “it is not possible to precisely link the cause of the signs and symptoms to a specific chemical” (para 9.6) the report nonetheless concludes there were reasonable grounds to believe chlorine gas was the chemical (used as a weapon).

More worrying is the fact that the panel viewed documented evidence that showed other toxicologists had been consulted in June 2018 prior to the release of the interim report. Expert opinions on that occasion were that the signs and symptoms observed in videos and from witness accounts were not consistent with exposure to molecular chlorine or any reactive-chlorine-containing chemical. Why no mention of this critical assessment, which contradicts that implied in the final report, was made is unclear and of concern.

Ballistic studies

The unauthorised disclosure of the Engineering Assessment in May 2019 of the two munitions found at Locations 2 and 4, and subsequently acknowledged by the Director General as bona-fide, revealed the diametrically opposing views of inspectors within the FFM team. Although the panel does not have the technical competence to judge the merits of the contradicting studies (i.e. the study described in the final report versus the leaked engineering report), it was surprised by how little consideration was given to alternative hypotheses in the final report.

One alternative ascribing the origin of the crater to an explosive device was considered briefly but, despite an almost identical crater (understood to have resulted from a mortar penetrating the roof) being observed on an adjacent rooftop, was dismissed because of “the absence of primary and secondary fragmentation characteristics”. In contrast, explosive fragmentation characteristics were noted in the leaked study.

Testimonies

The reporting of witness statements and the lack of any meaningful analysis highlights the partiality of this report. Whilst two clearly distinct and opposing narratives are described by witnesses, only the one supportive of the use of toxic weapons contributes to the conclusions. The imbalance between numbers of persons interviewed by the respective FFM teams in Damascus and in Country X is noteworthy, with twice as many of the latter being interviewed.

Exclusion of inspectors and attempts to obfuscate

Contrary to what has been publicly stated by the Director General of the OPCW it was evident to the panel that many of the inspectors in the Douma investigation were not involved or consulted in the post-deployment phase or had any contribution to, or knowledge of the content of the final report until it was made public. The panel is particularly troubled by organisational efforts to obfuscate and prevent inspectors from raising legitimate concerns about possible malpractices surrounding the Douma investigation.

News OPCW Release

Panel Criticizes ‘Unacceptable Practices’ in the OPCW’s investigation of the Alleged Chemical Attack in Douma, Syria on April 7th 2018

Post author By Nathan
Post date October 23, 2019

The Courage Foundation convened a panel of concerned individuals from the fields of disarmament, international law, journalism, military operations, medicine and intelligence in Brussels on October 15^th. The panel met with a member of the investigation team from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international chemical watchdog. On this basis the panel issued the following statement:

Based on the whistleblower’s extensive presentation, including internal emails, text exchanges and suppressed draft reports, we are unanimous in expressing our alarm over unacceptable practices in the investigation of the alleged chemical attack in Douma, near the Syrian capital of Damascus on 7 April 2018. We became convinced by the testimony that key information about chemical analyses, toxicology consultations, ballistics studies, and witness testimonies was suppressed, ostensibly to favor a preordained conclusion.

We have learned of disquieting efforts to exclude some inspectors from the investigation whilst thwarting their attempts to raise legitimate concerns, highlight irregular practices or even to express their differing observations and assessments —a right explicitly conferred on inspectors in the Chemical Weapons Convention, evidently with the intention of ensuring the independence and authoritativeness of inspection reports.

However belatedly, we therefore call on the OPCW to permit all inspectors who took part in the Douma investigation to come forward and report their differing observations in an appropriate forum of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, in fulfillment of the spirit of the Convention. They should be allowed to do this without fear of reprisal or even censure.

The panel advances these criticisms with the expectation that the OPCW will revisit its investigation of the Douma incident, with the purpose of clarifying what actually happened. This would help to restore the credibility of the OPCW and work towards demonstrating its legally mandated commitment to transparency, impartiality and independence. It is of utmost importance to restore trust in the verification procedures relied upon to implement the prohibitions of the CWC.

Panel members:

José Bustani, Ambassador of Brazil, first Director General of the OPCW and former Ambassador to the United Kingdom and France,

Richard Falk, Professor of International Law, Emeritus, Princeton University; Visiting Professor, Istinye University, Istanbul

Kristinn Hrafnsson, editor-in-chief, Wikileaks

John Holmes, Maj Gen (retd), DSO OBE MC

Dr. Helmut Lohrer, MD, Board member of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and International Councilor of its German Affiliate

Prof. Dr. Guenter Meyer, Centre for Research on the Arab World (CERAW) at the University of Mainz

Elizabeth Murray, former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, National Intelligence (retd); member, Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity and Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in Intelligence (www.samadamsaward.ch)

PDFs

OPCW Statement